A Cognitive Grammatical Study of Possessive Constructions in Orwell’s ‘A Clergyman’s Daughter’

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Abstract
This paper focuses on investigating the syntax and semantics of possessive constructions in A Clergyman’s Daughter at the phrasal level, within the framework of cognitive grammar using Heine’s (1997) model of possessives. The study aims at analyzing the various semantic relations in possessive constructions from a cognitive grammar perspective, and showing that possession does have a privileged status in the semantics of other concepts. This, however, proves the fallacy of the traditional view. It also shows that there is a natural and systematic relationship between possessive constructions and cognitive constructional schemas that give rise to them through conceptual transfer, and are motivated by experiential gestalt. No model alone can account for all semantic relations expressed through prototypical possessive. After analyzing possessive structures using Heine’s (1997) classification of possessives, there remains a group of other semantic relations that Heine (1997) could not have given a label; they are uncategorized. For underlying grammatical structures of these possessives, Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) model is used, which propose that aspects of the experiential gestalt motivate the wider use of too complex possessive constructions.

Keywords: Cognitive Linguistics, Cognitive Grammar, Possessives Structures, Event Schemas, Experiential Gestalt

1. Introduction
Possession seems to be one of the central concepts of human cognition. In traditional approaches, the notion of possession is considerably unclear; they fail inherently to provide a natural satisfactory explanation of how the
same morpheme comes to express highly diverse semantic relations. First, traditional grammarians divide the meanings expressed by possessive constructions (PCs hereafter) into various sub-groups and treat these as homonymous, in that the different semantic relations are not related to each other, only structurally they are the same. Actually, Quirk et al. (1985, p.322) admitted that their semantic classification “is in part arbitrary”. Second, representatives of the structuralist school and some modern syntacticians, like Chomsky (2002), assume that there is some abstract meaning which is general enough to cover all the various uses of the genitive. This abstract/general meaning shows the unity of the genitive constructions without coinciding with any of them in meaning, that is, the process of “understanding a sentence” can be explained in terms of the notion of linguistic level (p.92). The data collected from the novel proves how the traditional approaches are wrong and thus contradict the data.

The dissatisfaction with these aspects of traditional approaches motivate cognitivists to claim that the grammatical structure of possessives is predictable to a large extent once people know the range of possible cognitive structures from which they are derived. Consequently, there is also an assumption that possessive expressions are seen as a matter of conceptual integration of the semantic structures of the two component items, namely: possessor and possessum (PR-PM hereafter).

A crucial research question is how cognitive grammar implements cognitive abilities in conceptualizing a range of semantic relations expressed through typical PCs. Another research question is how and why there are so many different relations expressed by PCs only, not by any other nominal structures. A third important question is why PCs can be traced back to other domains of human experience.

It is hypothesized that there are some concepts in language for which there is no grammatical structure because they are too abstract and complex. As a result, the speakers use the same constructions used for expressing notional possession and ownership due to aspects of similarity. It is hypothesized that Heine’s (1997a, 1997b) model can account for all PCs. Another hypothesis is that grammar does not always reflect what is in the minds of the speaker. In language, there are highly abstract concepts which grammar cannot conceptualize. Thus, such concepts are generally conceptualized by structures of some concrete or less abstract concepts with which they have some affinity.

2. Literature Review

Numerous cognitive linguistic studies have conducted research on how and why the very same nominal possessive structure is used to express other concepts that have nothing to do with possession. However, to the best of the current researchers’ knowledge, so far no research has been conducted
regarding the analysis of various PCs in any literary works by Orwell or any other modern novelist. Thus, the present research is an attempt to fill in this gap and its insights provide a cognitive grammatical account for the PCs in Orwell’s *A Clergyman’s Daughter* or in any other authentic and modern literary works in general.

### 3. Possessive Constructions in Cognitive Grammar

Possessive expressions are neither integrated at random nor conditioned by formal rules. The integration of the subparts of a composite structure is governed by valence determinants and conceptual relations. Valence is the capacity of two structures to combine. One significant determinant resides in the phonological and semantic compatibility between the subparts of an expression. Every construction, whether lexical or grammatical, is characterized as an assembly of symbolic structures (Langacker, 1993).

#### 3.1 Langacker’s Reference-Point Construction

The reference-point analysis offers a detailed account of the identification mechanism set up within possessive NPs. Langacker argued that, conceptually, there is not really an “extra” argument. The reference point model is based on “our basic cognitive ability to invoke one entity [the PR] as a reference point for establishing mental contact with another [the PM]” (1995, p.27; Payne & Barshi, 1999, p.12). The relationship between the reference point and the “target” (=PM) is just a special case of metonymy, and thus one might further argue that there is no real “extra” argument. This is, of course, most persuasive in the case of part-whole relationship and inalienable possession. Since the aim of using a reference-point construction is to make a target entity more accessible by tying it to a reference point, Taylor argued that it is to be expected that the reference-point should be more easily mentally accessible than the target, as “it would be perverse indeed to invoke a less accessible entity to aid the identification of a more accessible entity” (Taylor, 1996, p.210).

#### 3.2 Lakoff and Johnson’s Model of Possessive Constructions

Possession is analyzed as an experiential gestalt, in the sense of Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Aspects of the experiential gestalt motivate the wider use of the possessive construction. The baseline of this theory was laid by Lakoff and Johnson in their *Metaphors We Live By* (1980). According to Lakoff and Johnson as well as their followers, a certain concept fit into an experience through conceptual metaphor. Metaphor by itself is conceptualizing and experiencing one domain, called target domain, in terms of another, known as source domain. Lakoff and Johnson’s monograph is also regarded as the birth date of cognitive linguistics, cognitive semantics, and cognitive
grammar to explain why PCs are structured the way they are. Cognitive semantics has been reinforcing the fact that metaphor is pervasive. It is a cognitive issue and the nature of human conceptual system is metaphorical in both thinking and acting. Thus, linguistic expressions are based on these conceptual metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).

To Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p.5), “the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another”. The conceptual metaphor theory has been considered as the cornerstone of the cognitive semantics to represent the relationship between language, mind, and embodied experience (Evans, 2007; cf. Evans & Green, 2006).

4. Heine’s Model of Possessive Constructions

Apart from the two models mentioned above, there is also Heine’s model that the study uses for analyzing the PCs extracted from the novel. According to Heine (1997a), possession belongs to the kind of concepts that tend to be described as being inherently vague and fuzzy. PCs are used for a wide range of contents. This is why Heine claimed that linguistic expressions for possession are meaningless, that is, English items like –s, of, and have are semantically empty. They are called ‘colorless’ because the possessive concepts expressed by them are said to be indeterminate. Heine (1997a) argued that the relationship each PC expresses is so versatile and it is tempting to claim that any relationship between two entities can be expressed as possessive. In addition, possessive expressions are likely to have other, non-possessive, meanings. For example, there is no doubt that the sentences in 1a and 1b are instance of possessions, but 1c-d are not (Heine, 1997a):

(1) a. Ron has a parrot.
   b. They have a company.
   c. A tree has leaves.
   d. Who has the exact time?

Observe the oddness of the verb have in 1c and 1d, which can appear in a wide variety of contexts, and express a variety of very different relations. Alternative terms such as ‘relational,’ ‘associative,’ and the like have been proposed to refer to concepts that include possession but are not confined to it. Heine claimed that possessive relation can comprise any relationship which may feasibly hold between a PR and a PM, and which may at times resemble the notion of ownership only superficially. To illustrate that, Heine gave the example of the attributive possessive relation Suzanne’s car to refer, for example, to a car that Suzanne wanted to buy but never did, or to a car that she sold, or to a car that she saw, mentioned, etc. In short, it may denote possession, but it may also stand for meanings that bear no discernible relationship to possession (Heine, 1997b).
4.1 Alienable and Inalienable Possessive Constructions

Heine (1997a) observed that the PM is regarded as either inalienable or alienable to the PR. According to him, there are two kinds of possessions generally; inalienable and alienable possession. The inalienable category, for example, has also been called ‘intimate’ or ‘inherent’. Superficially, the distinction is a straightforward one; items that cannot normally be separated from their owners are inalienable, while alienable possessions are those with whom it is possible, in some way, to sever or terminate the relationship of possession (e.g. through loss, sale, or theft). Thus, items belonging to any of the following conceptual domains are likely to be treated as inalienable (Heine, 1997a):

1. Kinship terms
2. Body-parts
3. Relational spatial concepts, like top, bottom, and interior, etc.
4. Inherent parts of other items, like branch, roof, and handle, etc.
5. Physical and mental states, like strength, thought, idea, and fear, etc.
6. Nominalizations, where the PM is a verbal noun, for example ‘his singing’, ‘the planting of bananas’.
7. OTHER Individual concepts, like name, voice, smell, shadow, footprint, property, and home.

4.2 Source Domains for Possessives: Event Schemas

According to Heine (1997b), complex contents are expressed by means of less complex and more basic contents, and abstract concepts are expressed by means of more concrete concepts. Grammatical concepts are fairly abstract; they do not refer to physical objects or kinetic processes, and they are defined primarily with reference to their relative function in discourse.

Event schemas are propositional in nature, and they are abstracted from the way people experience their environment and describe their experiences when communicating with other members. There is no evidence to suggest that event schemas are innate structures. What Comrie (1981) observed on language universals is that “innateness remains empty because it is just a name given to the set of language universals, and using this name should not blind us to the fact that a name is not an explanation” (p.24). Event schemas provide the structural templates of transfer (Heine, 1997b).

Heine (1997a) concluded that possession is a complex concept. That is why the realization is derived from more concrete and basic concepts, as distinguished from a simple relational concept. It thus seems that for Heine, there is no basic concept of possession, and all possessive predicates must be derived from one of the eight source event schemas he defines. The syntax of PCs is not distinct from canonical syntactic patterns within the language. He also suggested that the event schemas illustrated in Table 1 below, adapted from Heine (1997a, p.91), have cognitively distinct ways of conceptualizing
eventualities which come to overlap in meaning with the domain of possession via a process of grammaticalization, that is, PCs may be interpreted in terms of these schemas but not necessarily identical ways depending on the exact semantic contribution of those pieces (Heine, 1997a).

**Table 1.** A formulaic description of event schemas used as sources for PCs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formula</th>
<th>Label of Event Schema</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X takes Y (what one does)</td>
<td>Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y is located at X (where one is)</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X is with Y (whom one is with)</td>
<td>Companion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X’s Y exists (Being things around people)</td>
<td>Genitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y exists for/to X (existence)</td>
<td>Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y exists from X (existence)</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As for X, Y exists (existence)</td>
<td>Topic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y is X’s (property)</td>
<td>Equation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** X stands for ‘possessor’ and Y stands for ‘Possessum’.

### 4.3 Alienable Possessive Constructions in ‘A Clergyman’s Daughter’

All instances of alienable type of possession in *A Clergyman’s Daughter* are divided into three subcategories: animate alienable, unowned alienable, and inanimate alienable possessions. Animate alienable possession concepts are basic and typical PCs from the possession gestalt. In concepts of possession, the PMs are not semantically dependent on the PRs, that is, there is no conceptual dependency between the two entities. The following are extracted examples from 1935/2002 (p.42) and 1935/2002 (p.204), respectively:

A peaceful plume of smoke floated upwards from the Rector’s pipe. He was gazing with a meditative eye at the steel engraving of Charles I and had probably forgotten already about Dorothy’s demand for money.

About half an hour later they reappeared in Mr Warburton’s car, which was packed out of the front gate, and drove off in the direction of the Ipswich road.

In the above examples, the PMs ‘pipe’ and ‘car’ are not inherently relational to the PRs. Conceptualization of these entities need not invoke any specific relation to ‘the Rector’ and ‘Mr Warburton’. There is, therefore, no referent inherent in the semantic structure of the PRs which could function as an optimal reference point in terms of conceptual dependency. In these examples, ‘the Rector’ and ‘Mr Warburton’ are humans, and humans have maximal cognitive salience, that is, the schematic characterization of these phrases is based on the reference-point model. The PRs are conceived in relation to the PMs, via the speakers’ mental contact and conscious awareness. ‘The Rector’ and ‘Mr Warburton’ are salient, informative, and
intrinsic to serve as mental address for ‘pipe’ and ‘car’. For example, people who typically form their experience from moment to moment realize that ‘pipe’ and ‘car’ have to be possessed and related to individuals. People generally do not think of the world as being populated by material things when no one bears ownership to them, each of which has a person attached. Rather, they think of the world as being populated by people and animals. These factors point to a clear asymmetry in which owners are natural reference-points, and this leads to the identification of ‘pipe’ and ‘car’ (Langacker, 1993).

Syntactically and semantically speaking, these two instances are originally derived from Location construction. This natural systematic process of structuralizing concepts through concept transfer shows that human language is actually a natural process. Thus, the phrases come from the semantics of location construction; when someone says “a car is located at Mr Warburton’s house”, “a pipe is located at the Rector’s house”, these basically mean that ‘Mr Warburton has a car and the Rector has a pipe’. A speaker indirectly conveys his message of referring to the fact that ‘Mr Warburton’ owns a ‘car’ and ‘the Rector owns a ‘pipe’. According to the Possession-as-Location (PAL) hypothesis, possession relation is a type of location relation; the morphosyntactic similarities that hold between possessive and locative structures should be attributed to similarity at the conceptual level and not at the linguistic level (Heine, 1997a,1997b). What motivates a speaker to infer the originality of the phrase from Location Schema is this similarity of meaning. The ‘car’ and ‘pipe’ are typically located in the proximity of ‘Mr Warburton’ and ‘the Rector’; thus, they have full rights of access to them. Moreover, in the Location Schema, ‘the Rector’ and ‘Mr Warburton’ are conceptualized as the place that ‘the pipe’ and ‘car’ are located in/at. Even though possessive constructions may differ from locative constructions syntactically or semantically, they are locative in nature (Heine, 1997a).

Unowned PCs are less typical than strict PCs from possession gestalt. This is because in these concepts, PRs do not own the PMs and they do not necessarily express possession, but they convey accidental possession or temporary control. According to this notion, the PR can dispose the PM for a limited time but cannot claim ownership to it. However, the phrases behave in accordance with typical PC in virtue of some kind of similarity with at least one of the aspects of the prototype. Below is one of the instances extracted from the novel (1935/2002, p.193):

There was only one water tap in the camp, and that was two hundred yards from Dorothy’s hut, and the unspeakable earth latrine was at the same distance. It was a life that wore you out, used up every ounce of your energy….
Dorothy’s hut is derivative of the cognitive forces that give rise to it. This unowned possessive concept which is linguistically shaped can be extended to refer to other concepts of Location and Companion Schemas. Dorothy’s hut tends to share semantic similarities with the concepts these schemas convey. The ‘hut’ is typically described as being, existing or located, at the location and in the proximity of ‘Dorothy,’ occupying the same location for an extended period of time. This means that ‘Dorothy’ has control over the ‘hut’, and that she has given full rights of access to use it, but she does not own it. Likewise, the phrase can also be understood in terms of ‘something being accompanied by,’ the pragmatic sense of an utterance, like “Dorothy was there with a hut” and this means that ‘Dorothy’ is seen in a ‘hut’ next to her. Since the ‘hut’ is close to her, ‘Dorothy’ uses it, but does not necessarily own it. This conceptual transfer comes into play because the speakers have already experienced what concepts of “something located close to someone” and “being with” mean. The same goes for Cargill’s accountant (Heine, 1997a, 1997b).

Last but not the least, inanimate alienable possession concepts are non-prototypical PC from the possession gestalt in the sense that the PR is an inanimate thing and the PM is something that is relative to the PR. Very few instances concerning this class have occurred through the novel. One of the instances is shown below (1935/2002, p.198):

Mr Cairns, a stiff built man with grey whiskers, and two farm hands, were keeping guard over the stolen property that had been dug out of the straw of Nobby’s hut.

In this example, ‘Nobby’s hut’, as the whole, has informativity and cue validity to the conceptualization of ‘the straw’. This is because ‘Nobby’s hut’ is saliently and naturally lending itself to reference-point function since it is ubiquitous perceptually in human experience. In such concepts, ‘the straw’ is not semantically dependent on ‘Nobby’s hut’. The PM do not constitute an inherent part or things to the PR. ‘The straw’ is just an object put inside ‘the hut’. Conceptualization of the PM need not invoke any specific relation to the PR in terms of inseparability. Therefore, one can refer to ‘the straw’ without even giving reference to the PR. Humans cognitive ability detects the valence relation between the two entities, that finally leads to the conceptual integration mechanism for the two entities. In these two instances, speakers know very well the semantic realization of both entities, which pave a way for a semantic integration of both entities together and make an asymmetrical alignment for the speech production (Taylor, 1996).

The straw of Nobby’s hut is the interpretation of locative construction, because there is a kind of relation between the two entities in terms of location and closeness. ‘The straw’ is located relative to the ‘Nobby’s hut’ which means that ‘the straw’ is in close distance and is located in ‘the hut’.
Moreover, a descriptive utterance of “a hut with a straw,” hints at the pragmatic reading of ‘a hut contains a straw’. As a result, ‘the straw’ is with ‘the hut’ and one can find a ‘straw’ near ‘the hut’. Typically, ‘the straw’ is a comitative complement to the ‘Nobby’s hut’ subject. In accompaniment schema, the subject is typically the PR, the object is the PM, and the predicate marks the possessive relationship. This systematic process of constructional schemas stands in great opposition with modularism, because the nature of human brains, bodies, and environments constrains and shapes what and how people understand and reason. The same goes for the bank’s money (Heine, 1997a).

4.4 Inalienable Possessive Constructions in ‘A Clergyman’s Daughter’

From the point of view of Heine as a cognitivist, in inalienable possessions, the relationship between the PR and the PM is determined by the meaning of the PM. Also, relations on nouns are often referred as analogous to the thematic relations of verbs and their arguments.

4.4.1 Kinship Terms

In kinship terms, the PMs are semantically dependent on the PRs, that is, it is a requirement of the PMs that they be the kind of kin to somebody. Generally, humans’ cognitive ability reflects this great conceptual closeness of someone being close and relative to someone else. In fact, the speaker starts with the intention of referring to the PM, and then selects the PR most appropriate to this purpose. Consider the following example (1935/2002, p.459):

She paused to think of fresh items. Mrs J. was Mrs Jowett, the blacksmith’s wife; she came sometimes to be churched after her babies were born, but only if you coaxed her tactfully beforehand.

This example shows unprofiled relations. Hearsers know very well from their cognitive ability that ‘wife’ is conceptually dependent on the PR. It is not intrinsic as their conceptualizations need to make reference to ‘the blacksmith’. So it is almost obligatory of ‘wife’ that she be a ‘wife’ of somebody. This semantic dependency forces kinship terms to never appear without a PR (Taylor, 1996).

In this instance, one can find out that the relations people have by blood are permanent and show semantic relationships of closeness between the individuals. So, it is easier for a speaker to adjust a connection between location and possession, that is, possession as location in the sense that ‘the blacksmith’ is a location at the linguistic level, and that possessive and locative sentences have the same syntactic and conceptual structure. Situations in which objects are always or often close to a person provoke the implicature that they belong to that person, that is, ‘wife’ is typically
described as being, existing or located, at the location and in the proximity of ‘the blacksmith’. The same example can also be taken from accompaniment schema. This is because when people say “here comes the blacksmith with a wife,” they basically mean that there is an intimate relation between the two. So, in this case, speakers convey more than they say via a conversational implicature. The examples are also derived from Topic Schema in the sense that ‘the blacksmith’ functions as a possessive modifiers by appearing in topic position. In effect, the possessive relationship is established by asserting the existence of the ‘wife’ in relation to the topicalised PR; as far as ‘the blacksmith’ is concerned, there is a ‘wife’ (Heine, 1997a, 1997b).

4.4.2 Body-Parts

In body-part terms, the PMs are also semantically dependent on the PRs, that is, it is a requirement of the PMs that they be an inherent part of whole. Thus, the parts are thought to represent the whole, and the whole is intrinsic to the conceptualization of the part. The following is an instance of this class (1935/2002, p.61):

He pinched Dorothy’s bare elbow—she had changed, after breakfast, into a sleeveless gingham frock. Dorothy stepped hurriedly backwards to get out of his reach….

In this example, ‘bare elbow’ is defined with respect to a typical individual, which consists of a nose, two eyes, two ears, a mouth and so on. ‘Dorothy’ has maximal cognitive salience. People typically do not have individual awareness of body parts, such as ‘bare elbow’, except as they relate to whole individuals. People generally do not think of the world as being populated by such, each of which has a person or other animate beings attached. Rather, they think of the world as being populated by people and animals, and they become aware of the particular parts only in the context of ‘Dorothy’ (Taylor, 1996).

Most importantly, the original meaning and structure of this instance is originally taken from Accompaniment schema, because the semantic relations expressed by body-part possessives are so related to the concrete meaning of ‘one is with something.’ The pragmatic sense of the Companion schema ‘someone is accompanied by something’ hints at the fact that when someone is in an accompaniment of something, it mainly gives the concrete meaning of someone being in a very close distance with the thing that is accompanied. Without this source schema, there would not have occurred a natural and systematic way of giving meaning to whatever concepts is in the minds of speakers. This is basically because meaning is in the minds of speakers as conceptualizations of the concrete embodied experiences. So, the body-part PCs are basically influenced by a real factor. The PR is described as having a bare elbow. So, its meaning and structure are derived from a
concrete structure, like “Dorothy with bare elbow”, in the sense that ‘bare elbow’ is a comitative complement and ‘Dorothy’ is a subject (Heine, 1997a, 1997b).

4.4.3 Relational Spatial Concepts

In Relational spatial concepts, the PMs are semantically dependent on the PRs, because there is an inherent semantic spatial relationship between the two entities. This implies that the PMs constitute an inherent spatial side to the PR. The following two examples of this kind are extracted from the novel 1935/2002 (p.82) and 1935/2002 (p.301), respectively:

She took Dorothy between her large, gnarled hands, whose knuckles were as shiny as skinned onions from age and ceaseless washing up, and gave her a wet kiss. Then she drew her into the unclean interior of the cottage.

She spent all the daytime lurking in a dusty, forlorn room at the top of the house which was a sort of museum of bric-a-brac dating from 1880 onwards.

The PR and PM involve proximity; the spatial parts are maximally close to the wholes of which they are a spatial part of. So, there is a relational spatial concept between the PR and PM. However, this type of semantic relation between them sounds like the one between the two entities of typical PCs in a sense that there is a kind of relation that links the entities together. In fact, the concepts of relational space are so complex to an extent that the users do not have a certain nominalized structure to express these concepts through. Hence, the cognitive forces inside the minds of the speakers look for a concrete structural meaning to conceptualize the structure of relational spatial concepts through basic PC (Langacker, 1993).

According to Heine’s model (1997a, 1997b), relational spatial concepts have their original meaning from predicates whose original meaning has a lot to do with a Location and Accompaniment Schemas: the constructional schemas that people encounter on their daily basis and which they experience. The spatial notions ‘the interior’ and ‘the top’ are parts in an encyclopedic conceptual dominion for wholes. This makes sense for English, given the flexible semantics of possession. Both instances have roots from these constructional schemas, because of semantic affinity. When someone says “a cottage with an unclean interior”, “an unclean interior in the cottage” or “a house with a top”, “the top part in the house”, it is as if they describe a cottage having an unclean interior, or an interior located in the cottage, and that ‘the interior’ is an inseparable spatial part of ‘the cottage’, and is located close to it. So it is always seen with it. Thus, speakers perceive the aspects of similarity in meaning concerning ‘proximity’ and ‘being with’ in conceptualizing concepts of spatial parts. At the linguistic level in companion schema, ‘the
interior’ and ‘the top’ are the entities that accompany the wholes, which are the objects, and the wholes are accompanied by the entities, which are the subjects, and the predicate marks the possessive relation. In Location Schema, the PMs are conceptualized as being located in a close proximity of the PRs, and the PRs are conceptualized as the places where the PMs can be found.

4.4.4 Inherent Parts of Other Items

The inherent parts are thought to represent the whole item, and the whole item is so informative to the conceptualization of the part. Consider the following examples extracted from 1935/2002 (pp.16-17):

Dorothy drew a long glass-headed pin from the lapel of her coat, and furtively, under cover of Miss Mayfill’s back, pressed the point against her forearm. Her flesh tingled apprehensively.

There is a conceptual dependency between the two entities; a concept of ‘the lapel’ of the item cannot be formed into a conceptualized structure till the item is known. There is a meronymic relation between the two entities. The wholes typically consist of many, perhaps even an indefinite number of both physical and abstract parts, and generally no one part has privileged status in the conceptualization of the wholes. Consequently, the wholes are highly suited to function as reference points and thus Landmarks (LM hereafter) for the identification of the parts, which are the trajector (TR hereafter).

There is a cognitive systematic way to account for almost all concepts which speakers have. In the two examples above, when someone says “Dorothy wore a coat with a lapel,” this basically gives the hearer a literal meaning that Dorothy’s coat has a lapel on it. This is the case because people through their experience of the notional ‘existence’ and ‘being with’ can readily presuppose that the descriptive sentences uttered are interpreted as ‘a coat designed with a lapel’. Indeed, this mainly gives a sense of ‘togetherness’. The two constructions may be interpreted in overlapping but not necessarily identical ways depending on the exact semantic contribution of the Accompaniment Schema.

4.4.5 Mental States and Attributes

In such concepts, the PMs are abstract properties and are semantically dependent on the PRs, that are the experiencers, that is, it is a requirement of the PMs that they be an abstract property of an individual. Thus, the abstract properties which are sometimes called stimulus represent the experiencer. The experience of a cognitive state is a better cue for the identification of the target than the stimulus that causes the cognitive state. A huge number of instances concerning this class have occurred through the texts. Below are
instances of this class shown from 1935/2002 (p.133) and 1935/2002 (p.203), respectively:

Most of Dorothy’s agitation had disappeared by the time she reached the rectory.

[In leaded type] Rumour, as yet unconfirmed, states that she was recently seen with a male companion in a hotel of evil repute in Vienna.

In Dorothy’s agitation, the experiencer ‘Dorothy’ serves as a reference point for the conceptualization of the stimulus ‘agitation’. In a hotel of evil repute, the attribute holder ‘a hotel’ has a high cue validity and intrinsiness to serve as a reference point for the identification and conceptualization of the attribute target ‘evil repute’. This is because it is natural to conceptualize a specific property in accordance with the holder, not the other way around (Taylor, 1996). In accordance with the intuitive understanding, these instances, too, are very closely related to possession. In some ways, an attribute is a means of identifying an individual and some possessions may also be the same. Moreover, some attributes e.g., a good figure, can be acquired as most possessions can too.

In Dorothy’s agitation, ‘agitation’ is an abstract noun. ‘Dorothy’ is involved in the kind of mental state in a way that one can notice and feel the existence of these mental qualities from her. Thus, the meaning and structure of these concepts are historically and originally taken from a concrete semantic structure of ‘something that exists from someone,’ or ‘there is a kind of attribute in someone,’ as well as a companion schema ‘being with someone or something’. ‘Dorothy’ can be with a companion of the ‘agitation’ since she is the holder and experiencer of this mental state. They may experience these many other times in their lives; so the state is with them. The original meanings of attributes come from physical descriptive structures, like “they built a hotel with evil repute”. Since speakers do not have certain structures for everything they may happen to want to talk about, they refer to more concrete concepts stored in their cognition to find the categorizing relationships between abstract concepts and the concept of the constructional schema, which is something outside the innateness of the set of formal rules. Thus, cognitivists declare that there is a systematic and natural way for the identification of concepts that grammar cannot reflect; this is done through the shared link of semantics between the two concepts (Taylor, 1996).

4.4.6 Nominalizations: Verbal PM

Nominalization PCs are even further from typical possession than the other classes mentioned earlier from the possession gestalt. In expressing such concepts, the PMs are conceptually dependent on the PRs, that is, it is a
necessity of the PMs that they be an obligatory action and activity someone or something has undergone or is a participant in it. Instances are illustrated below from 1935/2002 (p.199) and 1935/2002 (p.362), respectively:

When she got back to the hut, the other women were sitting up, talking excitedly about **Nobby’s arrest**.

But she (Dorothy) realized, too, that if she began crying it would be the last straw and the parents would demand **her dismissal**.

The two instances are concepts denoting an event, and the deverbal nouns in these instances are called episodic nominalization. This is partly because the expressions tend to represent a single instance of the process, and also because the deverbal nouns naturally take the TR as PMs. In the instances above, the LMs ‘Nobby’ and ‘Dorothy’ are relatively more intrinsic to a conceptualization of the event than the TRs ‘arrest’ and ‘dismissal’ to the extent that the change in state of the LMs entity can be conceptualized relatively independently of its cause. Looking at the PC of ‘**Nobby’s arrest**’ one can propose that the PC is semantically indeterminate and context-dependent, because the same phrase of deverbal PMs can convey a concept of a participant in an action. This is why the informativity of the reference point with respect to the target is not a fixed invariant property, but may be modified by various contextual circumstances (Taylor, 1996).

Most importantly, the semantics and structure of event concepts expressed by PC are originally derived from Topic Schema. The structure and meaning of this schema correspond to existential ‘be’ construction. Heine (1997b) claims that in order to understand why PCs are formed the way they are, there has to be a description of salient processes of conceptual transfer. Speakers form their experiences regarding the notion of existence, make a link between the meaning of the concept they want to express, and the semantics of the constructional schema. The meaning of **her dismissal**, is taken from ‘the existence of something’, like when somebody says “there is an act of dismissing Dorothy as far as she knows”, it is as if a speaker has said ‘Dorothy’s dismissal’. ‘Dorothy’ serves as a possessive modifier by appearing in topic position. The possessive relationship is established by asserting the existence of ‘dismissal’ in relation to the topicalized ‘Dorothy’ (Heine, 1997a, 1997b).

### 4.4.7 Other Individual Concepts

Inseparable concepts of human beings are non-prototypical instances of actual paradigmatic possession from the possession gestalt. An instance concerning this class is illustrated below from 1935/2002 (p.298):

The accursed chance that **Dorothy’s surname** was the same as his own had made his life a misery for the past fortnight....
In expressing this concept, ‘surname’ as the PM, is semantically dependent on the PR. This implies that there is a conceptual dependency that the PM be an obligatory unique concept, that are specific and related only to humans, to represent the individuals, and the individuals are so intrinsic to the conceptualization of the specific concepts. This instance is originally taken from concrete concepts of Topic schema in a sense that there is a similarity relationship of meaning between the individual concept of ‘Dorothy’s surname’ and the notion of ‘existence’. The term ‘existential sentence’ is used to refer to a specialized or non-canonical construction which expresses a proposition about the existence or the presence of someone or something. As a result of their special structural and interpretive characteristics, existential sentences have offered a rich ground on which to test theories concerning the semantics of noun phrases. By the time ‘Dorothy’ has been given the ‘surname’, she is a girl with a ‘surname’, and since she is called by it, as far as she is concerned, there is a ‘surname’; wherever she goes, she is called and recognized by the ‘surname’. So, the pragmatic sense of ‘there exists something as far as someone is concerned’ gives rise to the PCs conveying concepts related to humans, because speakers know from their knowledge of the world and experiences that ‘existence’ basically means ‘the thing that exists in real world’ (Heine, 1997a, 1997b).

4.5 Uncategorized Possessive Constructions

There are some other concepts structuralized through typical PC that are uncategorized. These examples of cases cannot be put under any of the categories that Heine proposes. This includes cases of other instances he fails to categorize. The uncategorized PCs do not have their originality from the event schemas Heine proposes, but they are regarded as extremely marginal examples of typical PCs, and thus, have their originality from possession experiential gestalt. These uncategorized PCs are of four types of different semantic relations: description, measurement, temporal, and subject matter possessives. The first two instances of description possessives are taken from 1935/2002 (p.88):

Dorothy took the bottle of Elliman’s embrocation and carefully anointed Mrs Pither’s large, grey-veined, flaccid legs.

The other example extracted from 1935/2002 (p.361) is of possessives of measure:

…It was necessary that Mrs Creevy should give her ‘talking to’ in front of the parents, so that they might feel that they were getting their money’s worth and be satisfied.

Another instance of uncategorized possessives are taken from 1935/2002 (p.220) through the texts of the novel. It is of concepts of temporal possessives:
Deafie, her bin-mate, like herself, was picking against time, for it was the last money he would earn till **next year’s hopping season** came round.

Last but not the least, a considerable number of subject matter possessives have been detected through the texts of the novel, one of which is taken from 1935/2002 (p.90):

> It was that mystical joy in the beauty of the earth and the very nature of things that she recognized, perhaps mistakenly, as **the love of God**.

Some ideas of control, exclusivity, and perhaps a related idea of proximity may underlie the mapping. In the typical PC, at least, one can usually control what is nearby of one’s possessions, and the PMs in the above concepts are more close to a specific group of people or two related things that also have rights of access physically than other individuals or other things. In this sense, they are also more ‘controllable’. An onomastic example of **Elliman’s embrocation** indicates that it is not ‘Elliman’ who has an ‘embrocation’; rather, the phrase has become a conventionalized name for a kind of lotion, which is no longer identified with reference to the individual, ‘Elliman’; it is rather a kind of lotion named after ‘Elliman’. Likewise, in **next year’s hopping season**, the aspects of similarity are the exclusivity and proximity of the PR-PM relation. The notion of ‘hopping season’ is identified in the sense of ‘next year’ and not as other times or days, it is exclusive to ‘next year, only, and are close to that time (Taylor, 1996). Consider also an example, like **money’s worth**. The sense of its semantic relation is analogues to the basic sense of relational possession in that they designate the relation between a thing and measurable property. The notion of exclusivity and relatedness between PR-PM provides the conceptual link between the concept and the possession relation, in that ‘worth’ of something is talked about in the sense of ‘money’. It also mentions the value and worth related to money only and not to other things. Another instance is the use of genitive to express the concept of content e.g., **open pots of paint** illustrate a content-container relationship (Taylor, 1996).

If the metaphorical analysis is correct, the researcher has to identify directionality in the structuring of these meanings. According to Langacker (1993), the original meaning of basic PC starts out as more concrete (physically hold) from the possession gestalt and from there developed to more abstract and complex senses. The conceptual frames and domains of this basic PC motivate a natural systematic way of conceptualizing those concepts using the same genitive structure. This systematicity relies on a network of interrelated senses. The network is cognitive in nature, since it goes beyond the boundaries of a specific language, and consists of metaphorical links. Understanding other concepts as being a relation of possession involves being able to superimpose the multidimensional structure
of aspects of the concept of actual PC upon the corresponding structure of the four concepts mentioned above (Langacker 1987, 1991).

Lackoff and Johnson (1980) explain that such multidimensional structures characterize experiential gestalts, which are ways of organizing experiences into structured wholes. This is where grammar comes to be conceptualized. In the two hours’ work, the gestalt for Mr Warburton’s car is structured further by means of correspondences with selected relations between the activity and the time during which the activity exists. Thus ‘a car’, ‘Mr Warburton’ owns, and ‘a work’ that lasts ‘two hours’, are understood in terms of another, that something physical belongs to someone, and this sense of ‘belongingness’ motivates the process of conceptualizing the abstract and complex concept. Structuring people’s experience in terms of such multidimensional gestalts is what makes their experience coherent. People experience relations between the activity and the time during which the activity exists as relations of possession when the possession gestalt fits their perceptions and understandings in conversation. Thus, a concept fits experience, and helps in its conceptualization.

5. The Findings

Building on the theoretical issues raised as well as the practical section, the study comes up with the following findings:

1. Possessive constructions cannot be accounted for by following only one model; Heine’s model is inadequate and fails to account for all the semantic relations expressed through possessive structure. There has to be more models to capture the analysis fully.

2. PCs are related to existential, locative, and companion constructions. This means that their relation is suggested by the fact that these constructions exhibit the same rule behavior in certain uses, because they are schemas in their underlying structure naturally.

3. Event schemas serve as templates or metaphorical vehicles for referring to possession.

4. The data collected from the novel, as shown in Figure 1 and Table 2 below, incorporate the idea that linguistic possession does not always presuppose conceptual possession, but it motivates and gives rise to them. This is the reason why the number of occurrence for inalienable PCs is so much higher; and paradigmatic possession is not particularly frequent after all.

5. One cannot claim that Elliman’s embrocation and Dorothy’s agitation are ‘less good English structures’ than Mr Warburton’s car and the Rector’s pipe. What is an issue is the productivity of the typical PCs. As the nominals diverge more and more from the prototype, productivity declines. This connotes that the acceptability of a given
possessive expression becomes increasingly subject to matters of frequency usage, and each instantiation of the construction has to be listed separately. In Table 2 below, it is illustrated that the occurrences of inalienable possessives in an authentic real language usage is 1,268 expressions (=63 percent of the corpus), which is too high in comparison with an actual animate alienable possession relation, which includes 24% of the data. In addition, those concepts labeled uncategorized PCs, which Heine does not account for, consist of the lowest rate of only 13%.

6. The aspect of the semantics of the genitive that both the homonymy and the abstractionist hypotheses of the two traditional approaches fail to capture is the “sense of relatedness” status of each of the genitive functions. More so, some of the inevitable implications of such approaches actually contradict the data shown in Table 2 below.

Figure 1. Percentage distribution of inalienable possessive constructions in *A Clergyman’s Daughter* with types and their supersense label
### Table 2. The total number of occurrences for PCs in A Clergyman’s Daughter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Possessive Constructions in A Clergyman’s Daughter</th>
<th>Exact Number of Occurrences</th>
<th>Number by Percentage</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alienable PCs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Animate Alienable Possessives</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Unowned Alienable Possessives</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Inanimate Alienable Possessives</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inalienable PCs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Kinship Terms</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Body-Parts</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Relational Spatial Concepts</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inherent Parts of other Items</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mental States &amp; Attributes</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Nominalizations</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Other individual Concepts</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uncategorized PCs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Description Possessives</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Possessives of Measure</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Temporal Possessives</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Possessives of Subject Matter</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Possessive Construction Count:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Conclusion

The study arrived at the fact that there are certain cases which Heine himself could not subsume under any of the heading of categories of inalienable possessions. He calls them “OTHER”, apart from those uncategorized PCs to which he even could not account for. No possessive structure comes out arbitrarily; every single meaning of linguistic structures to satisfy communicative needs have a natural semantic source that helps shape the structure.

It is observed that people cannot just think of language as a more or less rigid and stable structure; they, instead, should think of those structures as flexible extra-linguistic in nature. Event schemas provide a convenient way of conceptualizing recurrent types of experiences, they are extremely useful for communication; and they are ideal for expressing what people think, feel, and want. Most of all, they provide convenient templates for describing abstract contents as possession. In fact, the way PCs are structuralized and the meanings they convey are all the products of human mind, and not a product of a set of inborn formal rules. Since the semantic networks associated with morphemes are open, new phenomenon can be assimilated to existing categories on the basis of perceived similarities. Humans have their cognition to provide the more natural and systematic linguistic patterns through conceptual integration of linguistic units.
The study also showed that there is no prototypical system of rules for each and every possessive complex semantic relation. That is why grammar alone does not suffice to explain human linguistic structures. Instead, linguists must look at the individual phrases of speaker’s expressions to understand their contribution to the semantics of the entire phrase containing them.

References:
